Showing posts with label Margin of Safety. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Margin of Safety. Show all posts

Sunday, July 08, 2012

The Main Streeter Portfolio (30 Jun 2012)


Volume 4 Issue 28: Intelligent Investing


The KLCI keeps breaking its all-time high and has breached the 1,620 level. Is this cause for joy, or will it be short-lived? If you are a strict market-timing top-down person, you really have to ask, what are the economic fundamentals telling? I'd say that things are lukewarm at best. Bank Negara maintained the OPR, while the ECB and PBOC cut interest rates. Malaysia still has some room to maneuver as it moves further and further away from depending on external demand for growth. Not that this is a good thing. Economic growth will be propped up in the next couple of years through government designated projects. The market is fuelled by election-related activities (aka massive IPOs, new investment projects announced etc) and when this blows over, speculators will be left groping for fresh bullish news and is likely to come up short.

There are two camps of speculators right now. Those who have sold because the market is at an all-time high and those that are buying high because they think they can sell higher. Who do we believe? That is actually a trick question. What makes you think you should be in either camp? That kind of herd mentality is for speculators.

Intelligent investors seek out stocks with high margins of safety. They dig and dig and dig to find good companies at good prices and swoop in for the kill. Remember that Mr. Market is your friend. He is there day in and day out telling you what he is willing to buy/sell at based on his mood.

All an intelligent investor needs to do is to keep his head down and do the homework and wait for Mr. Market to go crazy and offer you a deal you can't refuse on a good stock.

All said and done, here are the updated activities for The Main Streeter Portfolio. Harrisons paid a final single-tier dividend of RM0.20 per share for its financial year ended 31 December 2011.


30 Jun 2012

HARISON
Current Market Price: RM3.57
Cash Balance: RM90,048.48
NAV per share: RM1.0433

4 Jul 2012

HARISON
Current Market Price: RM3.42
Final Single-Tier Dividend RM0.20 per share
Dividend Received: RM800
Cash Balance: RM90,848.48
NAV per share: RM1.0453

Disclaimer: All company analyses, including the paper portfolio that appear in this newsletter are derived from facts gathered from various sources and the contributors' personal opinions and for education purposes. It is NOT an invitation to deal in securities, and especially not a recommendation for buying or selling any stock. The contributor(s) do not guarantee the accuracy of the facts being presented. The accuracy of such facts are only as reliable as the sources that they are obtained from. Please consult your investment advisers before acting on any information provided by the analyses here. The authors most likely have interests in the stocks that are discussed in this website.  




Tuesday, April 10, 2012

Who Is Mr Market?

Here is some insight on how the stock market behaves and why we need to feel like we understand it:
Why are journalists covering the market allowed, day after day, to write vapid articles about the market? What is it about using language like this that makes us comforted? 
My guess is that people want there to be such a man, and moreover want him to be understandable and reasonable. 
It’s primarily a question of control – control over our lives, as if we can say, as long as we kind of get his (the market’s) sentiments, we can avoid catastrophic risks. Like in those human nature tests where 85% of people consider themselves better than average drivers, we feel that we understand the market and so we’re covered and safe. Even when there’s plenty of evidence that we don’t actually understand the risks, we continue the market myth out of this need to feel in control.


Thursday, March 29, 2012

Volume 4 Issue 12: Intelligent Investing

Gambling Like A Value Investor


For those of you who think this is a shortcut or a method to break a casino by playing blackjack, I say, "Run, you fools!"

This is a story of a man who "broke" Atlantic City by winning USD6 million in a 12-hour run. Before the run at Atlantic City, he also took Borgata for USD5 million and Caesar's for USD4 million. 

On the surface, many of us would marvel at Don Johnson's skill at playing blackjack. One or two of us may even be inspired to try our hand at becoming good at blackjack. But as the article says, Don Johnson is very far from being a top-notch blackjack player, whatever that means. 

No matter how skilled you are, the odds of a blackjack hand are still around 50-50. And anyone who knows anything about gambling must certainly know about the Gambler's Ruin. Basically, it is a probabilistic concept which governs any betting scenario, even ones that have positive expectations (which means, the player has a higher probability of winning a hand compared with the banker). So here are some possible outcomes of what this Gambler's Ruin is all about:
  • The original meaning is that a gambler who raises his bet to a fixed fraction of bankroll when he wins, but does not reduce it when he loses, will eventually go broke, even if he has a positive expected value on each bet.
  • A gambler with finite wealth, playing a fair game (that is, each bet has expected value zero to both sides) will eventually go broke against an opponent with infinite wealth.
If you are curious about the reasons, just go ahead and click on the link provided above. Yes, that's right. The odds are highly stacked against the player simply because the casino's wealth is approaches "infinite" when compared with a typical player like you and me (or we call, "the Main Streeters")

So the only logical conclusion on how Don Johnson defeated the three casinos must be because he had more wealth than the casinos. Or is it? Here is how I see it. 

1. Skill
First, it goes without saying that Don Johnson is no fool. He may not be the best blackjack player in the world, but he is a good enough player. If you asked Warren Buffett if he is the smartest man on the planet, he would be the first person to tell you that he isn't. Like investing, blackjack does not require a lot of smarts. Just simple mathematics. So, armed with a slightly mathematically inclined mind, Don Johnson was ready to break the casinos. 

2. Wealth
Second, Don Johnson is a high roller. This means that he has millions and millions to spare, which is to say, the gap between his wealth and that of the casino, is significantly narrowed. As a result, the probability of the gambler's ruin being applied to Don Johnson is much much lower compared with a Main Streeter.

3. Margin of Safety
Third, Don Johnson applies one of the most fundamental rules in value investing. He keeps a huge margin of safety. If you get through far enough in the long article, you will see this:
Johnson is very good at gambling, mainly because he’s less willing to gamble than most. He does not just walk into a casino and start playing, which is what roughly 99 percent of customers do. This is, in his words, tantamount to “blindly throwing away money.” The rules of the game are set to give the house a significant advantage. That doesn’t mean you can’t win playing by the standard house rules; people do win on occasion. But the vast majority of players lose, and the longer they play, the more they lose.


Sophisticated gamblers won’t play by the standard rules. They negotiate. Because the casino values high rollers more than the average customer, it is willing to lessen its edge for them. It does this primarily by offering discounts, or “loss rebates.” When a casino offers a discount of, say, 10 percent, that means if the player loses $100,000 at the blackjack table, he has to pay only $90,000. Beyond the usual high-roller perks, the casino might also sweeten the deal by staking the player a significant amount up front, offering thousands of dollars in free chips, just to get the ball rolling. But even in that scenario, Johnson won’t play. By his reckoning, a few thousand in free chips plus a standard 10 percent discount just means that the casino is going to end up with slightly less of the player’s money after a few hours of play. The player still loses.

But two years ago, Johnson says, the casinos started getting desperate. With their table-game revenues tanking and the number of whales diminishing, casino marketers began to compete more aggressively for the big spenders. After all, one high roller who has a bad night can determine whether a casino’s table games finish a month in the red or in the black. Inside the casinos, this heightened the natural tension between the marketers, who are always pushing to sweeten the discounts, and the gaming managers, who want to maximize the house’s statistical edge. But month after month of declining revenues strengthened the marketers’ position. By late 2010, the discounts at some of the strapped Atlantic City casinos began creeping upward, as high as 20 percent.

“The casinos started accepting more risk, looking for a possible larger return,” says Posner, the gaming-industry expert. “They tended to start swinging for the fences.”

Johnson noticed.

“They began offering deals that nobody’s ever seen in New Jersey history,” he told me. “I’d never heard of anything like it in the world, not even for a player like [the late Australian media tycoon] Kerry Packer, who came in with a $20 million bank and was worth billions and billions.”

When casinos started getting desperate, Johnson was perfectly poised to take advantage of them. He had the money to wager big, he had the skill to win, and he did not have enough of a reputation for the casinos to be wary of him. He was also, as the Trop’s Tony Rodio puts it, “a cheap date.” He wasn’t interested in the high-end perks; he was interested in maximizing his odds of winning. For Johnson, the game began before he ever set foot in the casino.
 
So how did all these casinos end up giving Johnson what he himself describes as a “huge edge”? “I just think somebody missed the math when they did the numbers on it,” he told an interviewer.
...
Johnson did not miss the math. For example, at the Trop, he was willing to play with a 20 percent discount after his losses hit $500,000, but only if the casino structured the rules of the game to shave away some of the house advantage. Johnson could calculate exactly how much of an advantage he would gain with each small adjustment in the rules of play. He won’t say what all the adjustments were in the final e-mailed agreement with the Trop, but they included playing with a hand-shuffled six-deck shoe; the right to split and double down on up to four hands at once; and a “soft 17” (the player can draw another card on a hand totaling six plus an ace, counting the ace as either a one or an 11, while the dealer must stand, counting the ace as an 11). When Johnson and the Trop finally agreed, he had whittled the house edge down to one-fourth of 1 percent, by his figuring. In effect, he was playing a 50-50 game against the house, and with the discount, he was risking only 80 cents of every dollar he played. He had to pony up $1 million of his own money to start, but, as he would say later: “You’d never lose the million. If you got to [$500,000 in losses], you would stop and take your 20 percent discount. You’d owe them only $400,000.”
In his own words, this is the very essence of the concept of "margin of safety". Being a high roller, he twisted and twisted the odds in his favor, banking on the desperation of the casinos for his "business". With a 20% discount, the odds were already heavily stacked in his favor. And note this: 
“You’d never lose the million. If you got to [$500,000 in losses], you would stop and take your 20 percent discount. You’d owe them only $400,000.”
He never plays until he goes broke. In essence, what he is saying is, every time he loses money, he would only lose 80%. But every time he wins money, he would win 100%. Essentially, even though at each hand, the game was 50-50, his expectations of winning are significantly higher. 

For those who are interested in the mathematics, His expected "earnings" for each dollar he brings into the casino are simply:
0.5 x (-0.8) + 0.5 x (1.0) = 0.1
What this means is that he is expected to make a return of 10% every time he goes to the casino. This is of course, assuming that he does not go broke, which goes back to my second point about having a huge bankroll to begin with. How many of us can have that kind of odds at a casino? 

4. "Luck"
Fourth, another point which is also one of the key concepts of value investing is what many of us think of as, "luck". But as the Roman philosopher Seneca says, "luck" is when preparation meets opportunity. Given his circumstances (i.e. being adept at simple arithmetic, and having the bankroll to play, along with an acute interest in gambling (how else would he know about such negotiating tactics?), he was presented with a "wonderful" opportunity in the sense of the casinos' desperation. The casinos were too desperate to make a quick buck of a big whale like Don Johnson and took more risk than they could truly afford by granting him all the tiny tweaks that he requested. If the casinos had not been suffering due to the recession in the US, this sort of opportunity would not have presented itself. 

5. "Greatness"
Fifth, and what I think is the most important of all, is what I termed "greatness", for the lack of a better term. I am not saying that Don Johnson was born great or anything like that. To me, having good "luck" is awesome, but it is very far from being enough. Don Johnson had the right skill set, the money to play, and the opportunity to take advantage of. But what separates Don from the rest, is the fact that he TOOK that opportunity. Some of us may call that balls of steel, guts, courage, instinct or what not, but I really don't care. I don't know the right term for it.

The key important thing here is the fact that he took advantage of an opportunity which presented itself in the midst of one of the greatest recessions since The Great Depression. This is one of the most important lessons I have learnt recently in my life, and I will most certainly write more on this in the future. 

But for today, the takeaway message from this issue of the Main Streeter is that the concepts of value investing applies just as well in other aspects of life. Think of value investing as a lifestyle. It is not necessarily just applied in the realm of investing, but it can be applied in any shape and form in pretty much every aspect of our lives. 


Monday, December 19, 2011

Volume 3 Issue 51: Intelligent Investing

The Making Of A Rogue Trader

Who would have thought that doubling down and going for broke in times of desperation is an instinctive response that are found in the yellow-eyed junco (a type of bird)?:
"To know what goes on in the mind of a rogue trader – and that of every reckless gambler – it helps to be a bird-watcher. The yellow-eyed junco is a type of sparrow found in Mexico and the southern USA. Thirty years ago, three evolutionary biologists at the University of Arizona carried out a series of experiments with seven yellow-eyed juncos that had been caught in the south-east of the state. 
"The experiments were designed to test the birds’ gambling instincts, and the results were intriguing. One bird at a time was placed on a perch in an aviary 3.5 metres from two dishes covered with paper so that it could not spy the contents. The bird was trained to realize that if it flew to the first dish, it would always find two millet seeds to eat; if it flew to the second, it couldn’t be sure of what it would contain. Half the time, there would be four seeds, and half the time there would be none. The biologists were trying to discover how much risk the juncos would take in foraging for food – their main activity in the wild. Mathematically, the two choices were identical since a 100 per cent chance of two seeds was the same as a 50 per cent chance of four…. 
"In the first experiment, the birds were kept hungry for an hour and then allowed to start choosing dishes, with the seeds being replenished every thirty seconds. This meant that, whichever one they chose, they would get plenty to eat unless they were very unlucky. The juncos responded by being risk averse: in nineteen out of twenty-five cases, they chose the sure thing – the dish with two seeds – rather than risk finding nothing. 
"Next, the birds were starved for four hours, and the seeds were replenished only every minute. That tipped the birds into what the scientists called ‘a negative net energy budget’ – gaining two seeds each time they made a choice would not provide enough food to satisfy their hunger, and ultimately to keep them alive and enable them to reproduce. The birds responded by flying to the other dish instead. Facing loss, they started to gamble. 
"The scientists, led by Thomas Caraco, now a biology professor at the State University of New York, concluded that ‘juncos in nature will generally avoid risk unless they face difficult energetic stress’. In other words, they will choose the safe option for feeding – the closest natural equivalent to financial traders making money – unless they find themselves in danger, either through hunger or because it is chilly and they face a cold night requiring reserves of energy. 
"The choices are instinctive rather than intellectual, and they make evolutionary sense for the species. ‘Facing the possibility of starvation, animals are willing to gamble on the “strike-it-rich” policy of risk-prone foraging,’ writes Barry Sinervo, a professor of ecology at the University of California. ‘Some foragers will have a string of bad luck and starve. Some will have a string of average luck and still starve. However, there will always be those lucky few that experience a string of good luck. It is those lucky few that survive and pass on genes to the next generation’…" 
--John Gapper, How to Be a Rogue Trader
Maybe that is why some people say that traders have to have good instincts. As for me, I think that is why trading is most definitely not for everyone and is highly risky for the uninitiated. It relies heavily on instincts and emotions. Of course, you can throw in charting and technical analysis to help "remove" the emotional element, but very often, we see what we want to see.

HT: Brad DeLong

Monday, October 17, 2011

Volume 3 Issue 43: Intelligent Investing

Investing In Blue Chips or Bull Shit?

Nowadays, I have noticed some "pundits" who keep calling for the market to drop further just to show that they are smart. While they think that "normal" people would not want the market to drop, they think that they are "smarter" by wanting the market to drop further so that "good opportunities" present themselves. This is because their underlying mentality is that they want to "Buy Low, Sell High".

However, the question that is rarely answered is, "What to buy?". Sometimes, the market is just so low that they will tell you, "Just buy anything la...". This is very scary. Let me just show you a bunch of examples. Before the 2008 financial crisis, companies like Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, Bank of America, Bear Stearns, Merill Lynch, etc are considered "the best" of their lot. I mean, in the financial industries, if you didn't know any of those names, you would be considered ignorant. So if you had purchased any one of those companies in 2007 in the midst of the "Buy anything la..." period, this is how much poorer you will look like today:

Investors in Goldman Sachs would have lost more than 50% of their money

Goldman Sachs
Investors in Morgan Stanley would have lost more than 75% of their money

Morgan Stanley
Investors in Bank of America would have lost 85% of their money

Bank of America
Investors in Citigroup would have lost 93% of their money!!!!

Citigroup
Investors in Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Merill Lynch would have lost more than 90% of their money as well.

Now, many of these stocks are considered "blue chips" prior to the financial crisis. So, most people would not think twice about investing in them if I were to just bring up their names.  Sad to say, there is no such thing as "Just buy anything la...".

If you want to be in the stock market, you need to do your homework. There are no two ways about this. Just to illustrate how burnt you would be if you invested in Citigroup (once considered the largest bank in the world), if you invested USD100,000 in Citigroup in 2007, you would have lost 90% and be left with USD10,000. Not only that, to break even and get back what you lost, you would need to make 1,000%. That's right.

How hard is 1,000%? Well, assuming you can make 10% per year consistently, it would take you more than 24 years to break even. Yup, what you lost in one year can take you 24 years to make back. By that time, you would have sworn to stay away from the stock market forever.

HT: Brad DeLong



Sunday, June 19, 2011

Volume 3 Issue 25: Intelligent Investing

Can You Trust Your Favorite Analyst?

Check out this brief summary on what happened to Muhibbah in the recent 20% drop in its share price. You should be insanely pissed off at CIMB Research for their call. It just shows massive negligence. If you are still not convinced why you need to think carefully before you trust your favorite analysts, read this uber comprehensive analysis on Muhibbah and then perhaps you will then think twice before you trust your brokerage reports again.

A while ago, I wrote about the sheer negligence in some analyst's research and also about how some research houses have the tendency to get you to Buy High and Sell Low.

In short, don't jump into the water just because someone else tells you it is safe. There really is no free lunch. If you want to profit from investing, you simply need to do your homework.

Saturday, June 04, 2011

Volume 3 Issue 22: Intelligent Investing

Buy High, Sell Low?

Even though I hate quoting the Star, but it does have the most convenient example of why IPOs suck. Just from the following paragraphs, it is already clear:


One company that comes to mind is Malaysian hard disk-drive component maker JCY International Bhd, which was listed on the Main Market over a year ago. The company promised a good growth story and was touted at one point during its fund raising exercise as potentially being South-East Asia's largest technology IPO exercise since 2000.
Based on previous news report, YKY Investment Ltd, controlled by Malaysian businessman Y.K. Yong, had originally wanted to sell some 530.2 million existing shares, or 25.9%, of the company to institutional and non-institutional investors at RM1.60 to RM2.20 per share.
Since listing in late February 2010, the company has seen its share price take a beating, losing 62% of its listing price value and ending at 61 sen as at last Friday. The lacklustre appeal in the stock has been mainly due to declining profits although analysts had said then that the company was likely to do well on the back of the technology industry having a bright future.

Can you imagine losing 60% of your money in one year? It is mind-blowing. If you had RM10,000 invested in JCY, you would be left with about RM4,000. That's not the worst part. The worst part is, to get from RM4,000 back to RM10,000, you would have to make a total return of 150%. But but but.... all you lost was 60%. Why do you now have to make 150% to break even? That is the unfairness that is life. That is why it pays to be prudent, and to have a huge margin of safety.

To rub it in, check out that last paragraph above:

...The lacklustre appeal in the stock has been mainly due to declining profits although analysts had said then that the company was likely to do well on the back of the technology industry having a bright future.

ANALYSTS had said that the company was likely to do well. So, it is all the analysts' fault then? So what happens next? Can we claim our money back from those analysts? Well, here's the kicker:

Many of the “buy” calls recommended by research houses covering the stock have been switched as of late last year to a “sell” or “hold” due to the company's poor earnings. From the six quarterly results announced by the company after its listing in February last year, two quarters reported growth in revenue and earnings, one quarter saw revenue and net profit somewhat plateau while the last three quarters recorded a decline in revenue and earnings.

Hey, that's easy. Once the company has already tanked, let us all switch our calls to "SELL". We often here all the analysts telling us, "BUY LOW, SELL HIGH". But what? Wait... did I hear wrongly? What happened with JCY was, they asked you to BUY AT RM1.60, but then now, they ask you to SELL AT AROUND RM0.60. Isn't that "BUY HIGH, SELL LOW"?


So, there are two lessons to take away from this:

1. I hate IPOs. They may be good on paper, and may promise a lot, but at the same time, it could be a lot of hot air. My take is, if the company is a good one, it will still be around five to ten years from now, and it would not be too late to buy then.

2. Many analysts do not have accountability. One one hand, they preach a "Buy Low, Sell High" mantra, but what they are essentially doing is to get you to "Buy High, Sell Low". Some stockbrokers are even worse. They will tell you to "Buy High, Sell Higher"!!!!! And when the stock tanks, they don't even have the guts to tell you that they are sorry. They are not accountable. You will hear reasons like:

a) Oh, no one can predict the market. (Then why the hell did you tell me that it will go up when you asked me to buy? Were you not trying to predict it?)


b) Oh, the information has changed, so it changes our analysis. (No shit. You change your advice AFTER the fact of the price drop (change in information?). My boss would say that that person is not an analyst. He/She is a historian.)

Because of nonsense analysts like the ones mentioned above, us Main Streeters have to analyze the analysts. We need to analyze which analysts can be trusted, and which can't. And the easiest way to do that, is to look at long-term results. Who gives you the most consistent performance, through the longest time period?

Sunday, January 30, 2011

Volume 3 Issue 5: Two-Cent Economics

Finding Inelastic Demand to Fight Inflation




In the previous issue of the Mainstreeter, we brought up how companies that produce goods with price inelastic demand could raise prices to pass on the effect of higher costs to its customers. This would in effect, pass on inflation to their customers, and thus buffering their profits.

While we can go into great detail about what price elasticity means and talk about its mathematical derivation for the sake of precision, we should keep in mind the goal of using this concept as a tool to help us look for good companies to invest in.

Because of that, we would only venture as far as the intuitive definition of price elasticity. In the broad sense, as the term elasticity suggests, price elasticity of a good measures the sensitivity of its quantity demanded to a change in price.

In all our explanation, we shall assume that the goods we are discussing face normal demand curves, in that when the price of that good increases, the quantity demanded will fall. Now for the formal definitions.

A good that is price elastic is one which would have a more than proportionate decrease in quantity demanded for an increase in price. Conversely, the quantity demanded for a price inelastic good would decrease by less than the proportionate price increase. 

Here is a better illustration. For example, if the quantity demanded for cheesecakes fell by 15% (more than 10%) when the price of cheesecakes increased by 10% during the Chinese New Year, then the demand for cheesecakes would be classified as price elastic.

In the case of vegetables, the 10% increase in price during the same season caused the quantity demanded for  vegetables to drop by 5% (less than 10%). This means that the demand for vegetables are price inelastic.

While it may need a bit more justification, I would just like to point out that when the demand for a particular good is price inelastic, an increase in price would raise the total revenue received for selling the good. This is because the rise in prices more than offset the decrease in quantity demanded. Also, a relatively price inelastic demand curve would allow the producer to pass on rising costs to consumers by raising prices. Bear in mind that it is in this context that we are looking at price elasticity.

Now that we have the definitions out of the way, what causes the demand for goods to be price inelastic? That is what we want to look for when we are analyzing the products of the companies that we are researching.

1. Availability of substitutes

This is intuitive. If the good that the company we are looking at produces has many substitutes, it would be less able to raise prices because its customers could easily switch to buying from the company's competitors. Hence, we want to invest in companies that produce goods which not many other companies can produce. For example, aeroplane engines. Not many companies in the world can produce aeroplane engines apart from Rolls-Royce. In addition, the quality of the engines also play a huge role because of the safety requirements needed in the aeroplane industry and not many people can match that.

2. Price as percentage of income

When a good costs very little as a proportion of our income, we tend to pay less attention to its price increases. Hence, the good would be relatively price inelastic. If we are talking about say, a car, then any amount of price increase would create a bigger deterrence to purchase as the car comprises a large portion of  our income.

3. Degree of necessity

This ties in with the vegetable example. Goods that are perceived as necessities tend to be price inelastic. Another example would be banking services. Most of us need to use banks for savings, loans, credit card purposes.

4. Brand loyalty

Well, this is pretty self-explanatory. Some of the more famous brands I can think of are probably Coke, Apple, and Intel. Barring anything that would give these names bad reputation like what Toyota is facing, it would be difficult to disrupt the brand loyalties that these companies have. Hence, an increase in prices would unlikely change the preferences of their customers.

That said, it would be rather difficult to find companies that produce goods that have all of the above factors. Nonetheless, we can look for goods that have as many of the above-mentioned qualities as possible. Bear in mind that there are a few other minor factors that I left out, but these should be a good enough guideline to get you started.

Of course, price elasticity may not have to be applied to only consumer goods. It can be applied to intermediate goods as well. So, when you try to think of goods that are price inelastic, do not limit yourself to end-products. Think of the ingredients and parts as well. These will help you find companies that can maintain robust earnings through inflationary periods. This is particularly important as we are possibly experiencing a period of high inflation right now. Firms that are not flexible enough to pass on the rise in raw material costs will take a hit in their profit margins and could even suffer losses in the coming quarters.

That could be a good excuse for the stock market to cool off even more and provide some buying opportunities.

Sunday, January 02, 2011

Volume 3 Issue 1: Intelligent Investing

Margin of Safety


By now, I do not have to tell you that there is most definitely more than one way to make money through investing. However, what most of us know, but almost never practice, is that there is no easy way to make money through investing.

Many of us are very tempted by promises of such and such people who profess the "sure-make-money" type of investments. Very often we hear people say things like, "Next year the stock market will go up. Just buy any stock and you will make money," Or you hear recommendations of such and such stocks which will "definitely" double by next week. In fact, we are always in search of such opportunities. I am not here to burst your bubble. Such opportunities do exist, but only when fortune shines upon us. Much like when we buy the lottery.

Not going to expound on the intricacies of probability theory today. In this issue, I would like to introduce the most fundamental misconception that people have about investing. Very often, we hear the phrase, "High risks, high return, and low risks low returns". To me, this is the biggest fallacy of investing. The reality is very often, high risk and negative returns. Some people buy the lottery their whole lives and never even make a dime off it. Some people invest in the stock market based on tips and rumours and lose a huge chunk of their fortune. And then they vow to stay away from the stock market forever.

Little do they fully comprehend the definition of high risk, which in the most common of definitions, mean that there is a very high chance of losing money. It is as simple as that. In Walking Down Main Street, we will explore investing opportunities that can possibly offer high returns, yet expose you to minimal risks. How do we achieve this? In Benjamin Graham's definitions, we call these things "margin of safety".

In the stocks that we are going to look at, not only do we hope to find strong consistent earnings, but we will also emphasize on finding very high margins of safety. This margin of safety manifests in many ways and in most cases, are very specific to the stocks themselves. But you can be sure to expect Walking Down Main Street to highlight these safety measures that can help you sleep soundly at night.

Finally, there is such a thing as low risks and high returns. Don't let your mutual fund consultants fool you otherwise. The next time before you purchase any unit trust or stocks, ask yourself, what is my margin of safety?